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TONTINES FOR THE INVINCIBLES: ENTICING LOW
RISKS INTO THE HEALTH-INSURANCE POOL WITH AN
IDEA FROM INSURANCE HISTORY AND BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS
TOM BAKER* AND PETER SIEGELMAN**
Over one-third of the uninsured adults in the U.S. below retirement
age are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old. Young adults,
especially men, often go without insurance, even when buying it is
mandatory and sometimes even when it is a low-cost employment benefit.
This Article proposes a new form of health insurance targeted at this group,
the “young invincibles”—those who (wrongly) believe that they do not need
health insurance because they will not get sick. Our proposal offers a cash
bonus to those who turn out to be right in their belief that they did not really
need health insurance. The concept comes from the tontine life insurance
that fueled the rise of the U.S. insurance industry in the late nineteenth
century. A largely forgotten casualty of the 1906 “pacification” of the lifeinsurance industry, the tontine idea holds great promise for making health
insurance attractive to the invincibles. The tontine feature frames the healthinsurance purchase as a smart investment, rather than a way to spend
money for something the customer does not think he needs. Tontines make
insurance more attractive to the uninsured, without wasting funds by
subsidizing those who are already covered. We identify a particular class of
individuals (the invincibles), show how a specific cognitive bias accounts
for their irrational behavior, and design an insurance mechanism (tontines
or deferred dividends) to overcome the effects of this bias. The final
sections of the Article offer an empirically calibrated pricing demonstration
for a tontine health policy and an analysis of the legality of tontines in this
context.
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INTRODUCTION

They’re young and healthy, and insurance is expensive. As
long as they don’t . . . slip on the ice, crash a bike,
snowboard into a tree, rupture an appendix, or get hit by a
bus, everything will be fine. Right? 1

1.
David Amsden, The Young Invincibles, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 2, 2007, at 26.
See also Cara Buckley, For Uninsured Young Adults: Do-It-Yourself Medical Care,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1.
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Over one-third of all uninsured adults below retirement age in the
U.S. are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old.2 When young
adults, especially men, age out of the dependent-care coverage provided
by their parents’ employment benefits or public health insurance, they
often go without, even when buying insurance is mandatory and
sometimes even when that insurance is a low-cost employment benefit.3
In health policy parlance, these people are known as the “young
invincibles,” and are considered unreachable by ordinary health
insurance. Young adults grow older, and most of them eventually join
the health-insurance pool.4 But some of them face serious medical needs
during that uninsured period, and their lack of insurance for those
needs imposes costs on others in society—not to mention the
consequences for the young adults themselves.5
Health-care policy-makers have suggested a number of ways to
keep young adults in the health-insurance pool. Most obviously, a
universal health-insurance program would achieve this objective. Other
more targeted, incremental approaches include requiring employers to
increase the maximum age of children who may be covered under their
parent’s health-care benefits and increasing the maximum age for

2.
Jennifer L. Kriss et al., Rite of Passage? Why Young Adults Become
Uninsured and How New Policies Can Help, 38 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 fig.1
(2008) (citation omitted) (reporting that 29 percent of non-elderly uninsured are from
nineteen to twenty-nine years of age). Using their data, we compute that 37 percent of
the uninsured non-elderly adults are from nineteen to twenty-nine years of age.
3.
Sally H. Adams et al., Health Insurance Across Vulnerable Ages: Patterns
and Disparities from Adolescence to the Early 30s, 119 PEDIATRICS e1033, e1034,
e1038 (2007), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/119/5/e1033; S.
Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper, Gender and Uninsurance Among Young Adults
in the United States, 113 PEDIATRICS 291 (2004) [hereinafter Callahan & Cooper,
Gender and Uninsurance ]; S. Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper, Uninsurance and
Health Care Access Among Young Adults in the United States, 116 PEDIATRICS 88, 88,
90, 93–94 (2005) [hereinafter Callahan & Cooper, Uninsurance and Health Care
Access ]. For evidence that Massachusetts’s health-insurance mandate has reduced the
incidence of uninsurance among young adults (at the cost of some coercion), but has
left a significant fraction still uninsured, see Paul Wingle, Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector Authority, Presentation to Academy Health National Health Policy
Conference on Young and Uninsured (Feb. 4, 2008) (slides and handout available at
http://www.academyhealth/org/Events/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1512).
4.
See Adams et al., supra note 3, at e1036, e1038.
See, e.g., KARYN SCHWARTZ & TANYA SCHWARTZ, UNINSURED YOUNG
5.
ADULTS: A PROFILE AND OVERVIEW OF COVERAGE OPTIONS 6, 7 (2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7785.pdf (discussing the welfare consequences of
uninsurance, and the case for reducing it); S. Todd Callahan & William O. Cooper,
Access to Health Care for Young Adults With Disabling Chronic Conditions, 160
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 178, 181 (2006).
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participation in state-based public insurance programs.6 All of these are
costly and involve an element of coercion.
Instead of forcing them to buy something they do not value, or
making others subsidize that purchase, we suggest designing a product
that the young invincibles would be more willing to pay for. “One size
fits all” only rarely attracts consumers who have choices. Insurance
history and behavioral decision research suggest that insurance is just
like other consumer products or services in this regard. Different
people have different preferences for insurance. Designing new
insurance products to meet insurance-resistant young people’s
preferences offers a potentially promising new way to entice low risks
into the health-insurance pool.
To this end, we propose tontines for the invincibles—health
insurance that pays a cash bonus to those who turn out to be right in
their belief that they did not really need health insurance. The simplest
arrangement would award the bonus to those who did not consume
more than a threshold value of medical care during a three-year period,
potentially excluding preventive care. We discuss more complicated
arrangements below.
The tontine concept comes from the tontine life insurance that
fueled the rise of the U.S. insurance industry in the late nineteenth
century.7 Late nineteenth-century insurers seem to have understood
some things about human nature that were largely forgotten over the
intervening hundred years, only to be rediscovered more recently under
the aegis of behavioral economics. Tontine life insurance paid a
deferred dividend to policyholders who survived and faithfully paid
their insurance premiums for a defined period, usually twenty years.8
The amount of the dividend depended on how many people were left in
the insurance pool when the dividend was paid.9 A largely forgotten
casualty of the 1906 pacification of the life-insurance industry, the
tontine idea holds great promise for making health insurance attractive
to the invincibles today.10
6.
7.

Id. at 7–8, 12–13; Kriss et al., supra note 2, at 13–15.
Henry William Manly, On the American Tontine and Mutual Assessment

Schemes, 26 J. INST. ACTUARIES 182, 183–84 (1887).
8.
Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 183–85.
9.

10.
Products that offer a link between insurance or savings and probabilistic
prizes are not entirely dead. For more than fifty years, the government of the United
Kingdom has offered a Premium Bond program that “guarantee[s] holders risk-free
return of nominal principal” while paying a return that is “distributed to holders each
month by a lottery-like mechanism.” PETER TUFANO, SAVING WHILST GAMBLING: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF UK PREMIUM BONDS 1 (2008), available at http://www.
aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2008/2008_541.pdf. The bond has successful parallels
in some third-world countries. Id.
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There are, of course, many reasons why everyone should buy life,
health, and other kinds of insurance.11 But those reasons appeal to
rational, prudent people, and especially to the homo economicus who
populates traditional economic analysis. Insurance-resistant young
adults belong to another tribe, at least when it comes to health
insurance. They are “Humans,” not “Econs,” in Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein’s evocative terms; like other Humans, the invincibles
predictably err in ways we can understand and for which we can plan.12
Like other forms of choice architecture, our health-insurance idea is a
“nudge,” a menu-changing strategy that may help Humans make wise
choices.13
Tontine health insurance would differ from ordinary health
insurance or managed care in one main respect. Ordinary health
insurance provides a tangible benefit only when you need health care.
Tontine insurance would provide a tangible benefit even if you do not.
We emphasize tangible benefits because the intangible peace of mind
that insurance provides is demonstrably not enough to induce the young
invincibles to insure. A tontine health-insurance policy would pay them
a cash benefit when they do not use their health insurance, as well as
covering their medical expenses when they do.
The tontine feature frames the health-insurance purchase as a smart
investment, rather than as a way to spend money for something the
customer thinks he does not need. Indeed, the tontine feature provides
something close to the holy grail of health-policy planners: making
insurance more attractive to the uninsured without “wasting” funds by
subsidizing those who are already covered. The tontine has a role even
if Congress adopts universal-coverage health-care reform. Offering the
tontine would make it more likely that young invincibles would actually
enroll and remain in the program.
A growing body of work uses behavioral insights to explain
insurance demand. An early example is Eisner and Strotz’s paper
detailing the irrationality of flight insurance, which should not have
appealed to a rational consumer, yet was widely purchased.14 Johnson
11.
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, Uncertainty and Medical Care, in ESSAYS
THEORY OF RISK BEARING 200–01 (1971) (full insurance is optimal when
insurance is actuarially fair); Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76
J. POL. ECON. 533, 557 (1968) (same).
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
12.
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8 (2008) (contrasting “Econs”
and “Humans”).
See id. at 3–6, 8.
13.
14.
Robert Eisner & Robert H. Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of
Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355, 355, 364 (1961). Flight insurance remains far more
common than insurance economists believe. It has become less visible because the
IN THE
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et al., used experimental and anecdotal evidence to show that people
are willing to pay more for separate policies covering two risks
individually than for a single policy covering both of them together
(presumably because the separate events are more vivid).15
In recent work, Kunreuther and Pauly offer an extended taxonomy
of anomalies in insurance decision-making on both the demand and
supply side of the market, including consumers’ preference for
insurance policies that offer premium rebates, a concept that is similar
to our tontine idea.16 Their trenchant policy suggestions include
redesigning insurance coverage to make it more attractive to those who
“mistakenly” choose not to purchase it.17 Our work is also in the spirit
of recent papers in the behavioral economics of health and health
insurance. We share the conclusion of Jeffrey Liebman and Richard
Zeckhauser,18 and Richard G. Frank,19 that decisions regarding health
insurance and health care are precisely the kinds of choices that are
likely to be made poorly, and that insights from behavioral economics
can be used to justify institutional design in this area.
The idea that an overly optimistic assessment of risk stands as an
obstacle to effective demand for health insurance is by now quite
standard.20 Our contribution is to identify a particular class of
individuals (the “young invincibles”) subject to this bias, and to design
a novel insurance mechanism (tontines or deferred dividends) to
overcome its effects. In addition we identify the potential use of

airport kiosks of a previous generation have been replaced by automatic flight insurance
arrangements sold through credit cards. See Aviation Data, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel
Related Servs. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (describing flight
and baggage insurance program in the context of a consumer class action).
15.
See generally Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993).
16.
Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and
Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 63, 91–92 (2006).
See also David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the
Practice of Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
(Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004).
17.
Kunruether & Pauly, supra note 16.
18.
Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex
Insurance, Subtle Subsidies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14330, 2008).
19.
Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 4, 28
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10881, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10881.
20.
See, e.g., Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60
ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1236 (1992). For a recent appraisal of the evidence on optimism
bias, see Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, The Overconfidence Problem in
Insurance Markets (Econ. Learning & Soc. Evolution, Working Paper No. 116, 2004),
available at http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/squintani/overconfidence.pdf.
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deferred dividends to address ex post moral hazard in health insurance,
although we defer thorough exploration of this topic to future work.
There are some tricky issues to address in designing a tontine
health-insurance plan: for example, we do not want to discourage the
invincibles from using their insurance when they actually need it.
Before fully explaining the concept and addressing this and other
important issues, however, we first take a trip through life-insurance
history, back to a time when insurance companies more openly
acknowledged that they had to offer a little “spice” to get customers to
buy their products.21 We then set out the details of our proposal, using
behavioral decision research to explain the power of the tontine idea
and to address some theoretical objections.
I. TONTINE LIFE INSURANCE
Tontine life insurance emerged in the United States in the midnineteenth century and became a resoundingly successful alternative to
traditional life insurance.22 A tontine life-insurance policy paid a
deferred dividend to policyholders who timely paid their life insurance
premiums for a specified period: ten, fifteen, or twenty years,
depending on the policy that the applicant chose.23 People who died
earlier would receive the stated death benefit, but they would not
receive any share of the dividends. With this arrangement, a tontine
life-insurance policy paid a cash benefit to customers who otherwise
might think that they had lost their bet with the insurance company.24
Before the advent of tontine policies, mutual companies paid
dividends, but they credited the dividends against the next year’s

21.
Historian Timothy Alborn quotes an early twentieth-century English
insurer, discussing the “noble work” of selling life insurance, who suggests that “man
is essentially a gambler, and it is this feeling that he may score off the insurance
companies . . . that induces him to insure.” TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE
INSURANCE AND BRITISH SOCIETY, 1800–1914, at 310 (2009). One broker advised that
customers who were “fond of excitement” could be induced to buy insurance by a
bonus scheme that added “a zest to life compared to which Kaffir Ketchup is insipid.”
Id. (referencing kaffir limes, the leaves of which are used as a spice in Asian cooking).
See Sharon Ann Murphy, Life Insurance in the United States Through
22.
World War I, EH.NET, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/murphy.life.insurance.us (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010) (“Estimates indicate that approximately two-thirds of all life
insurance policies in force in 1905—at the height of the industry’s power—were
deferred dividend plans.”).
23.
See Manly, supra note 7, at 184.
24.
ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310 (reporting that in 1891 “the Bankers’
Magazine attributed [the] popularity [of tontine life insurance] to ‘the element in human
nature which disposes every individual to regard his own chances of life favourably’”).
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premium, in effect lowering the price of the insurance coverage.25 This
arrangement allowed mutual life insurance salesmen to collapse the
insurance premium and the policyholder dividend into a single number
when pitching their policies. Sheppard Homans, “the most prominent
actuary in the country” in the mid-nineteenth century, recognized the
explosive sales potential that lay in exploiting, rather than obscuring,
the dividend.26 He saw that the dividend could be cut loose from the
premium and then deferred to provide an enticing cash bonus for loyal,
healthy customers.
A company that deferred the dividends and then distributed them
only to policyholders who had faithfully paid their premiums for twenty
years would accomplish three very useful things.
First, the company would make its life-insurance policy more
attractive to men (and it was mostly men buying life insurance) who
liked a little spice packaged with an otherwise dull purchase.27 Second,
the company would give its agents an excellent answer to the prospect
who objected that he was healthy and did not need life insurance.28 “No
problem,” the agent could say, “our deferred dividends mean that you
can back your own life, and you cannot lose. Either you die and your
heirs emerge as the winner on your behalf, or you survive and we give
you a cash payment at the end of twenty years—and, by the by, no need
to let your wife or your creditors know about that little bonus.”29 Third,
the company would gain “one of the best solutions to the problem of
healthier lives lapsing at a higher rate than unhealthy ones—since
‘backing one’s life’ required the continued payment of premiums.”30 In
economic terms, the deferred dividend worked as an anti-adverseselection device. It appealed disproportionately to people who thought
that they were low risk, and it kept them in the insurance pool.
These new policies were called “tontine” life insurance policies
because of their similarities to an investment scheme developed by
Lorenzo Tonti in the seventeenth century and used by governments into
the eighteenth century to raise money, and to finance private projects

25.
See Gilbert E. Roe, The Insurance Investigation, in 3 THE MAKING OF
AMERICA 459, 462 (Robert Marion La Follette ed., 1973) (reporting that the leading
tontine life insurance companies had until 1868 paid dividends annually). The Equitable
Life Insurance Company introduced tontines to the market in 1868. See Roger L.
Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case
of Stifled Innovation, 1868–1905, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 379, 380 (1987).
26.
Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 380.
27.
ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
Id.
30.
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well into the nineteenth century.31 In the original tontine, contributors
pooled their funds and distributed the interest each year to the surviving
members of the pool, with the last living member “taking the whole of
the fund.”32 With tontine life insurance, all the members of the pool
who faithfully paid their premiums and survived to the end of the
predefined period split the fund. The tontine feature distinguished this
life-insurance product from a similar, but less successful product called
endowment life insurance, in which the amount of the deferred dividend
was fixed in advance.33
Tontine life insurance quickly swept the life-insurance field, and
the mutual life-insurance companies selling tontine policies became the
largest financial institutions of the day.34 At the same time, however,
the millions of dollars that the companies accumulated during the
deferral of the dividend proved too tempting to some of the managers
of the leading firms. The result was a scandal and investigation in 1905
that rocked the life-insurance industry more profoundly than anything
since.35 One key result was the prohibition of tontine life insurance—not
because there was anything wrong with such insurance in theory,36 but
rather because tontines allowed the life companies to amass enormous
reserves that led executives to public extravagance and gave them too

31.
See generally Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491-521 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340062 (noting that “[a] tontine was also one of the
options proposed by Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury to reduce the
national debt of the United States at the beginning of the Republic”). The serial murder
incentives posed by the tontine provided the plot for a story by Robert Louis Stevenson
and his stepson, Lloyd Osbourne, The Wrong Box (The World’s Classics ed. 1954)
(1889), which was made into a movie in 1966 (Columbia Pictures) (starring Michael
Caine, Peter Sellers, and Dudley Moore, among others).
32.
Manly, supra note 7, at 183.
See MERVIN TABOR, THE THREE SYSTEMS OF LIFE INSURANCE 29 (1900).
33.
34.
See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885–1910, at
56 (1963) (“Nothing was more fundamental to the business growth of the Big Three, or
more evocative of the values that governed them, than the deferred dividend policy.”);
Murphy, supra note 22; Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 380 (reporting that “[i]t is
generally acknowledged that the phenomenal expansion of the U.S. life insurance
business over the next thirty years was largely driven by the popularity of tontine
policies, helped along, perhaps, by the aggressive marketing techniques of the large
firms”).
35.
Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of
the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 637 (1993) (describing the Armstrong
investigation of the insurance industry as “the 1980s takeover wars, the junk bond
boom, and the insider-trading scandals rolled into one sustained event”).
See KELLER, supra note 34, at 58 (describing deferred dividend policies as
36.
“[appropriate] . . . to their market and their time”).
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much influence over the companies whose shares they purchased as
investments for the reserves.37
In short, tontine life insurance was so successful at vacuuming
money out of consumers’ pockets and into insurance companies’ funds
that states legislatures stamped it out as part of what Mark Roe has
called the “1906 pacification of the insurance industry.”38 It was not
until the late twentieth-century that the life-insurance industry was able
to reassemble some of the tontine’s heady mix of prudence and
speculation, in the form of the variable life and annuity insurance
products that bundle insurance and investment and dominate the lifeinsurance market today. But the life-insurance industry never regained
the economic control that tontines helped it gain in the late nineteenth
century.
For us, the payoff from this history lies in what life-insurance
tontines teach about the sales potential of insurance that allows people
to “back their own lives.”39 Ordinary health insurance, like ordinary
life insurance, amounts to a bet against the health of the purchaser,
since the insurance pays off handsomely only when something goes
seriously wrong. The tontine feature changes that equation and thus
should be especially enticing to people who think that they would lose
the ordinary health-insurance bet—the invincibles. In effect, the tontine
feature provides a hedge against the risk of paying what may, in
hindsight, seem like pointless health-insurance premiums.

37.
See H. Gerald Chapin, The Armstrong Amendments: A Synopsis of New
York’s New Insurance Legislation, 14 AM. LAW. 389, 389 (1906) (reporting that

section 83 of the legislation “requires that every policy issued on or after January 1,
1907, contain a provision ‘that the proportion of the surplus accruing upon said policy
shall be ascertained and distributed annually and not otherwise’”); Roe, supra note 25,
467, 473–74 (arguing that the tontine-fueled reserves were “being used as a compact
money power in the hands of five or six men to control the industries of the country”
and urging the prohibition of tontine and related deferred dividend life insurance
products); Roe, supra note 35, at 639.
38.
Roe, supra note 35, at 639. Roe focused largely on the companion
legislation prohibiting insurance companies from putting more than a small percentage
of their reserves into stock, but observing that the legislation also “restricted sale of key
insurance products, holding back . . . growth.” Id. at 670. See also Ransom & Sutch,
supra note 25, at 380–81 (reporting that the Armstrong investigation led to the
prohibition of tontine insurance). As Roe reports, the Armstrong investigation and
resulting legislation “fragmented and pulverized the insurance industry,” which had
been “on the verge of developing not into the passive institution [it] became, but into an
institution that would vaguely resemble the powerful German universal banks or the
main bank system in Japan.” Roe, supra note 35, at 639.
39.
ALBORN, supra note 21, at 310.
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II. TONTINE HEALTH INSURANCE: THE BASIC IDEA
A tontine health-insurance policy would pay a deferred dividend to
a policyholder who maintains his or her health insurance for a specified
period—we suggest three years (an arbitrary number that could easily
be changed based on market research). Significantly, the amount of the
dividend would depend on the extent to which customers use the health
insurance. The young invincibles who in fact turn out not to use very
much insurance would share the dividend, while those who use more
insurance would get their benefits from the policy exclusively in the
form of the covered health care they received.
The simplest arrangement would condition eligibility for the
dividend on the participant not having consumed an aggregate dollar
value of medical care above a pre-set threshold amount over the
relevant period, perhaps with the cost of preventive care not counting
against the threshold (in order to encourage preventive care). More
complicated arrangements might require the participants to receive
preventive care to be eligible for the dividend and, instead of a single
three-year period, there might be annual or even quarterly periods,
each subject to lower thresholds, offering participants the ability to lock
in some dividend rights as long as they did not exceed the threshold
during these shorter periods. In addition, the program might offer
periodic lottery-like prizes to eligible participants to help address the
problem of hyperbolic discounting. We will explore some of these
design options after we discuss the economics of adding the tontine
feature to health insurance.
In behavioral economic terms, tontine health insurance takes
advantage of the optimism bias that appears to be particularly prevalent
among the young invincibles.40 In addition, the tontine feature frames
the health-insurance purchase as a smart investment, rather than a way
to spend money for something that the customer does not really need.41
III. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF TONTINE HEALTH INSURANCE
To an economist, the idea of using what amounts to a gamble to
market health insurance has at least two strikes against it.
First, the very idea of “marketing” insurance—if marketing means
more than providing basic information on pricing and coverage—is at

40.
41.

See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
Cf. CHERIS SHUN-CHING CHAN, MARKETING DEATH: CULTURE

AND THE

MAKING OF A LIFE INSURANCE MARKET IN CHINA (forthcoming 2011) (describing how
local insurance companies gained market share from foreign insurance companies by
framing life insurance as an investment).

BAKER AND SIEGELMAN - FINAL

90

7/9/2010 2:38 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

odds with standard economic theory. Someone who is rational, riskaverse, and can buy insurance that is actuarially fairly priced,42 should
always want to buy it and should not need additional inducements—a
tontine “prize” or anything else—to “sweeten the deal.”43 However, the
evidence we review below suggests that there are indeed many millions
of Americans who have chosen not to buy health insurance that seems
roughly fairly priced and within their means.44 This is insurance
coverage they “should” want to purchase, according to standard
economic theory, but they do not do so. It is this group of potential
insureds who are the target of our policy proposal. We will shortly
explore the size of this population, the possible explanations for its
“insufficient” demand, and the problems that this poses for public
policy.
The use of bundled gambles to sell health insurance faces a second
objection as well: why should bundling tontine prizes provide any
inducement at all for someone to buy insurance? Insurance is ordinarily
understood to be motivated by risk aversion, while gambling is
motivated by risk preference.45 Since the two phenomena seem
inconsistent (at least on standard accounts), people who find insurance
attractive should have nothing to gain from adding an uncertain prize to
their coverage. Indeed, a risk-averse individual should by definition
42.
Actuarially fair insurance is that for which the premium is equal to the
expected loss: an insured facing a one percent chance of a $100,000 loss has an
expected loss of 0.01×100,000 = $1,000. If coverage for that risk costs $1,000, it is
fairly priced. Of course, perfectly fair pricing is rarely available, since there are
administrative costs to providing insurance, but fair pricing serves as a useful
benchmark.
43.
Indeed, one definition of what it means to be risk averse is that a rational
risk averse individual will always purchase actuarially fair insurance for any loss. If the
insurance is not fairly priced, it is not clear whether buying it would be welfareenhancing. In that case, inducing a rational actor to buy insurance through clever
marketing tricks might well be welfare-reducing, since anyone who would have
benefited from insurance would choose to buy it without the marketing. See LOUIS
EECKHOUDT ET AL., ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER RISK 51 (2005)
(explaining why a risk-averse individual will not want to purchase full insurance when
that insurance is not actuarially fair).
44.
We hasten to add that the many people lack health insurance not because
they choose not to buy it when they could and rationally “should” do so. Rather, there
are supply side problems (such as employers who do not offer insurance to their
workers) and other factors that account for a substantial fraction of the uninsured. Our
proposal is a modest one, whose goal is only to induce some fraction of the uninsured
population to take up insurance at a relatively low marketing cost.
45.
See, e.g., Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 289 (1948), who write that a riskaverse individual “will never participate in a ‘fair’ game of chance . . . [because] the
gain in utility from winning a dollar will be less than the loss in utility from losing a
dollar, so the expected utility from participating in the game is negative.”
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prefer a $1 cash discount on her insurance premium to tontine prize
with a $1 expected value.46 Why, then, do “prizes” involving gambles
(such as lottery tickets) seem to be an effective tool for marketing
insurance in other countries?47 Why does the historical record reveal
significant “gambling” elements in the marketing of insurance, until
such practices were banned in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries? And why are probabilistic rewards (such as lottery tickets) an
unusually effective motivational device in other contexts besides
insurance?48

46.
If the insured were not risk-averse, then they would presumably not find it
attractive to purchase insurance, even with the lottery ticket thrown in. But see
generally JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003)
(stating an alternative motivation for health insurance, based on access to expensive
care, rather than spreading financial risk).
47.
For example, regulations permit, and several insurers actually use, prizes
to market insurance in many Latin American countries. (It is worth noting that the
tontine prize differs from a lottery prize, in that the purchaser of the tontine policy may
believe that he has private information indicating the low nature of his risk and, thus,
the payoff of a tontine will not be perceived to be random. Indeed, this is one of the
appeals of a tontine to an optimist.) We have not found any instances of prizes for
health insurance, but drawings for prizes (keyed to the national lottery) are used in
Brazil, and insurers in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador also use prizes to market auto
and/or life insurance.
Peter Zweifel analyzes a premium rebate program—used by two of the ten largest
German health insurers in 1988—that was roughly homologous with our prize structure.
Peter Zweifel, Premium Rebates for No Claims: The West German Experience, in
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 323–46 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988). Zweifel employs a
standard neoclassical model (without the over-optimism assumption we feature) to
analyze the rebates. Although he does not consider the role of prizes in attracting the
uninsured, he does find empirically that “rebate options [prizes] are more effective in
restraining utilization of medical care in minor episodes of sickness than are . . .
deductibles and/or coinsurance.” Id. at 325.
48.
The use of probabilistic prizes as rewards for good behavior has been
studied in several non-insurance contexts, and such rewards have been found to be
highly effective in altering behavior, at relatively low cost. Since these studies were
conducted with an eye towards efficacy, rather than causation, they do not say much,
directly, about why probabilistic prizes should offer such strong incentives, but the
results are certainly compatible with the kind of optimism bias we believe is
characteristic of the invincibles. That is, subjects seem to over-value the probabilistic
prize, relative to its actuarially-fair equivalent, presumably because their subjective
assessment that they will win is higher than the true probability. See, e.g., Todd A.
Olmstead et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Prize-Based Incentives for Stimulant Abusers in
Outpatient Psychosocial Treatment Programs, 87 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 175
(2007) (showing that “lottery tickets” for small prizes could create substantial
incentives for drug addicts to comply with treatment protocols); Lorenz Goette & Alois
Stutzer, Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment (IZA
Discussion Paper No. 3580, 2008) (discussing rewards, in the form of lottery tickets,
for donating blood led to increased donation rates, without lowering the “quality” of
blood donors).
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A. Who Lacks Health Insurance, and Why? 49

Forty-seven million Americans did not have health insurance as of
2008.50 As Jonathan Gruber notes, roughly 32 million of these
uninsured persons were in families with incomes less than 200 percent
of the poverty line.51 These people may be too poor to buy health
insurance and are not the targets of our proposal, although some of
them might nevertheless respond positively to it. Our audience is the
remaining 15 million uninsured who are not poor or near-poor. Rather
than looking at the uninsured by income, we can look by age. Thirteen
percent of the non-elderly uninsured (those less than sixty-five years
old) are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and just under
one-third are between nineteen and twenty-nine.52 Of this group,
roughly half have incomes greater than 200 percent of the poverty line.
They are the special focus of our proposal. As Figure 1 illustrates, 80
percent of people have insurance at age eighteen (presumably through
their parents or through Medicaid), and nearly as high a percentage
have insurance at age thirty, but in the intervening years, the proportion
drops to just over 60 percent.

49.
This section draws heavily on a recent and authoritative survey article by
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 571
(2008). Gruber points out that the number without health insurance at any point in time
may be twice as large as the number without insurance over the course of an entire
year, suggesting that there is substantial mobility between insured and uninsured status.
Id. at 576.
50.
Id. at 575.
51.
Id. The poverty line for a family of four was $19,307 in 2004. For a
single individual under age sixty-five, the poverty line was $9,827. U.S. Census
Bureau, Poverty Thresholds 2004, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/
thresh04.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
52.
Kriss et al., supra note 2, at 2 fig.1.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Young Adults with and without Health
Insurance53
Gruber points out that surprisingly little is known about why those
who can afford it choose to do without insurance,54 but he considers the
following two major possibilities: adverse selection and behavioral
foibles of the invincibles.
1. ADVERSE SELECTION?
Many of the uninsured cannot get insurance from their employer,
and much health insurance available on the individual market is quite
expensive. A superficially plausible story—albeit one with little
supporting evidence55—is that individually purchased health insurance is
expensive because of adverse selection. Those who choose to go
without health insurance may be (unobservably) healthier than those
53.
Adams et al., supra note 3, at e1033, e1036 (based on data from 48,827
responses to the National Health Interview Survey).
54.
“[T]here are a variety of hypotheses for why so many individuals are
uninsured, but no clear sense that this set of explanations can account for 47 million
individuals.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 581.
55.
“[T]here is surprisingly little work on . . . whether those who choose to
be insured are adversely selected; the [only] two studies on this topic . . . reach mixed
conclusions.” Id. at 577.
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who do buy it, and therefore find it unattractive to pool with the
relatively sick who require high premiums.56 On this account, the
uninsured make rational comparisons between the cost of insurance and
their risk of illness, and when they find that insurance is over-priced
(given their risk aversion and a realistic assessment of their own risk of
illness), they choose to forego it. The evidence in support of this story
is fairly weak, however, and a recent Kaiser Foundation report
demonstrates that healthy young adults are actually more likely to be
insured than their sicker counterparts, which is inconsistent with most
adverse-selection models.57
Moreover, there are low-cost health-insurance policies marketed to
young people that appear quite affordable. For example, Tonik, a
health-insurance plan marketed explicitly to young people (with a Web
site featuring “hip” graphics, funky typefaces, and slang) and sold
directly to individuals, offers a plan with a $5,000 deductible, $20 copays for four in-network office visits per year (which are not subject to
the deductible), and some benefits for prescriptions and vision expenses
(also not subject to the deductible). The premium for California
residents is quoted as “as low as $88 per month.”58 That represents an
56.
If the healthy uninsured could credibly convey their health status to their
insurers, competition would drive down their premiums. Id. at 576–77. But on this
account, the healthy uninsured lack any means to distinguish themselves from the sicker
people who do choose buy insurance, and so they must buy at an actuarially
unfavorable rate appropriate for the sicker pool they would have to join. Id. at 577.
However, the healthy uninsured may distinguish themselves by not buying—presumably
there would be some health insurance package that would be worth their while, which
would probably involve low premiums & high deductibles. See infra note 58.
57.
The study finds that 73 percent of young adults in excellent or very good
health have insurance, while only 60 percent of those in worse health do. SCHWARTZ &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 6. This does not seem consistent with an adverse selection
story, under which it is the worst risks that should demand the most insurance. The
complex relationship between selection and optimism bias is explored in Alvaro
Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 1994 (2007). In Sandroni and Squintani’s model, where some high-risk
agents have incorrect perceptions of their own riskiness, many of the standard
conclusions about selection no longer obtain. Id.
See Tonik, California, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ca/ (last
58.
visited May 17, 2009); Tonik, Georgia, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ga/
(last visited May 17, 2009). The Tonik Web site quotes premiums for similar coverage
in the following states as follows: Colorado ($89), Connecticut ($145.83), New
Hampshire ($150.18), and Nevada ($103). See Tonik, Colorado, Cover Your A-Z,
https://www.tonik.com/co/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Tonik, Connecticut, Cover
Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/ct/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010); Tonik, New
Hampshire, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/nh/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010);
Tonik, Nevada, Cover Your A-Z, https://www.tonik.com/nv/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2010). Note that the average individually insured eighteen to twenty-nine year old paid
monthly premiums were approximately $120 in 2006–2007. See AHIP CENTER FOR
POLICY & RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 2006–2007: A COMPREHENSIVE
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annual premium of $1,056, only 4.7 percent of the annual income of a
single person earning twice the poverty line,59 and less than the cost of
auto insurance in many jurisdictions. Of course, whether Tonik is a
good buy depends on one’s degree of risk aversion, one’s probability
and cost of various types of medical treatment, the coverage Tonik
provides, and the possibility of alternative (free) care for those whose
medical bills exceed their assets. Nevertheless, at least as a first
approximation, the existence of such policies suggests that at least some
portion of the uninsurance problem for young adults remains
unexplained by conventional economics.
2. BEHAVIORAL FOIBLES: THE INVINCIBLES
A second possibility is that the young uninsured may not be
making reasonable judgments in the face of excessively high prices, but
may instead be reacting irrationally in some fashion. A simple but
appealing story is that they underestimate the probability that they will
get sick and need health insurance, a kind of optimism bias that has
been well-documented in many other contexts. Simply put, many
people tend to have an unfounded belief that bad things will not happen
to them. Such a belief, whether mistaken or not, obviously makes
insurance less attractive—why pay to cover losses that you “know” you
will not experience?
Optimism bias can be formally defined as the tendency of
individuals to believe that they are less likely to experience negative
events (accidents, job loss, poor health) than the average person, and
more likely to experience positive events.60 In an early study, Weinstein
found that such a bias was widespread among college students for both
positive and negative events.61 Weinstein also observed that the
SURVEY OF PREMIUMS, AVAILABILITY, AND BENEFITS 7 tbl.2 (2007), available at
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Individual_Market_Survey_December_2007.pdf.
59.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR 2008 BY SIZE OF
FAMILY AND NUMBER OF RELATED CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh08.html (listing official 2008
poverty threshold for a single person under sixty-five with no children as $11,201).
60.
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806, 806 (1980).
Id. at 806–07, 813–14. Optimism bias has even been given a possible
61.
neurological basis: more optimistic individuals (as measured by a psychological test)
were more likely to “expect positive events to happen closer in the future than negative
events, and to experience them with a greater sense of pre-experiencing.” Tali Sharot et
al., Neural Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, 450 NATURE 102, 102 (2007). In a
neuro-imaging study, the parts of the brain that may be used to retrieve memories of
past events in constructing representations of the future—in particular the rostral
anterior cingulate cortex—were more likely to be activated in positive imaginings
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“perceived controllability” was highly positively correlated with the
extent of optimism bias: subjects tended to be more optimistic about
events they believed they could control (contracting a venereal disease)
than about those they thought were outside of their control (buying a
car that turned out to be a lemon).62
Other studies suggest an important reason why the young should
be especially likely to experience optimism bias—they tend to lack
relevant experience with negative outcomes. As one survey put it,
Experience matters . . . . Drivers who have been hospitalized
after a road accident are not as optimistic as drivers who have
not had this experience. Similarly, middle-aged and older
adults are less optimistic about developing medical conditions
than their younger counterparts are, presumably because older
persons have had more exposure to health problems and
aging. Acutely ill college students (approached at a student
health center) perceive themselves to be at greater risk for
future health problems than do healthy students, indicating
that risk perceptions can be “debiased” if the person has a
relevant health problem. Acutely ill students, however,
continue to be unrealistically optimistic about problems that
do not involve physical health.63
In health policy circles, the uninsured who choose to “go bare” in
the belief that they will not get sick or be injured have a name: “The
Invincibles.”64 Although there is no definitive study of this group,
recent New York Magazine and Wall Street Journal articles are
suggestive.65 The Journal reported that companies trying to market
health insurance to young people found that such buyers were often
uninterested in plans that offered bare-bones (major medical) coverage
for premiums of $50 to $100 a month.66 “What came through loud and
clear in focus groups . . . was that people did not see value in a
[catastrophic coverage] plan with just a high deductible,” apparently

(relative to negative ones) in those who scored higher on a measure of psychological
optimism. Id. at 103.
See Weinstein, supra note 60, at 18 tbl.2.
62.
63.
David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health,
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 69, 80 (2004) (citations
omitted).
64.
See, e.g., Amsden, supra note 1.
Id.
65.
66.
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Insurers’ New Target: Companies Go After
the Uninsured with Cheaper Plans, Clever Marketing, but Benefits Are Sparser, WALL
ST. J., May 31, 2005, at B1.
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because they viewed such a plan as paying for something they would
probably never use.67
In order for the invincibles to be victims of optimism bias, they not
only have to believe they will not get sick; they must also be wrong in
their assessment of their own risk. Apparently, they often are. For
example, “[o]ne in five uninsured young adults report that they were
unable to get needed care due to cost, . . .[and] 18 percent . . . said
they could not afford a prescription” within the past year.68
Callahan and Cooper report similar findings based on the National
Health Interview Survey,69 a representative nationwide sample taken
between 1998 and 2001. Among respondents aged nineteen to twentyfour, even after controlling for income, race, and gender, “the
uninsured remained at significantly higher risk for reporting delayed or
missed medical care, not filling a prescription because of cost, having
no contact with a health professional, and having no usual source of
health care, relative to privately insured peers.”70 The lack of insurance
is a particular problem for young adults with chronic health
conditions.71 In subsequent work, Callahan and Cooper demonstrate
that those with chronic conditions who lacked insurance had six to eight
times higher rates of unmet health-care needs because of cost, when
compared to otherwise similar young adults who did have insurance.72
When a young adult develops a chronic health condition, he may
change his mind about the benefits of health insurance, but by then the
low-priced policies offered to healthy young people will not be
available. In sum, the blasé attitude about risks and costs that seems to
characterize the invincibles appears to be factually unfounded: the
invincibles may be healthier than the population average, but they are
ultimately no less vincible then their insured peers.73
67.
68.
69.
at 89.

Id.
SCHWARTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 7.
Callahan & Cooper, Uninsurance and Health Care Access, supra note 3,

70.
Id. at 88 (statistics omitted).
71.
Callahan & Cooper, supra note 5, at 181.
Id. at 180. Although people who already know that they have a serious
72.
chronic condition are unlikely to find tontine insurance appealing, some of the young
people with chronic conditions are likely to have developed those conditions only after
“aging out” of dependent care coverage and, thus, would have been good candidates
for the tontine health insurance.
73.
Of course, there is a large and growing catalogue of deviations from fully
rational behavior, and optimism bias is by no means the only possible explanation for
the invincibles’ failure to purchase health insurance. We focus on this explanation
because it seems to fit the stylized facts so well, and is so analytically tractable, but we
recognize that other explanations may play some role in the underinsurance problem. A
related type of irrationality is the tendency to “overvalue short-run insurance costs
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B. Why Adding a Prize to an Insurance Policy Should Make it Less
Attractive to Homo Economicus
This Section explores the logic of the standard model of insurance
demand and explains why a rational, risk-averse individual—an
“Econ”—would always prefer a fair insurance policy without an
actuarially fair prize to one that contained such a prize.
To start, consider a rational, risk-averse, expected-utilitymaximizing individual who faces a loss L with known probability p.
Since he is risk averse, his marginal utility of wealth falls as his wealth
increases. Thus, the individual benefits (in utility terms) if he can
reduce his wealth in the state of the world where wealth is high, while
increasing his wealth in the state of the world where wealth is low.
Moving a dollar from the high-wealth to the low-wealth state of the
world leaves him better off because he is giving up low-marginal-utility
dollars and getting back high-marginal-utility dollars, which are worth
more in utility terms.
Actuarially fair insurance is available when the premium charged
is equal to the expected loss (pL ), and any risk-averse individual should
want full insurance if it is available at the fair price. Full insurance
guarantees that the individual’s wealth is the same, regardless of
whether the loss occurs; this means that the insured has maximized
expected utility by equalizing the marginal utility of wealth in both
states of the world (whether the loss occurs or not).74 That in turn
implies that wealth itself should be equalized in the two possible states
of the world, which is only possible if the individual buys full
insurance.
Now, consider adding a stylized tontine “prize” to this problem.
(We can loosely define a tontine as any insurance policy that pays off
both when the loss occurs and when it does not. The “prize” is the
amount paid if there is no loss.) Under this arrangement the individual
can pick an amount of coverage, I, under the same conditions as above.
relative to [future] medical expenditure risk.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 577. This kind
of myopia has been extensively analyzed by behavioral economists under the rubric of
“time-inconsistency” or “hyperbolic discounting,” whereby individuals apply a steeper
discount rate to long-term benefits than to short-term costs. The term apparently
originated with George W. Ainslie. See G.W. Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21
J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 485 (1974). In this context, it can lead to
essentially the same results as optimism bias. Rather than understating the probability
that one will get sick and need benefits, a hyperbolic discounter applies too high a
discount rate to these future benefits, and thus ends up undervaluing them in
comparison to present costs.
74.
The only way for the marginal utility of wealth to be the same in both
states of the world is for wealth to be the same in both states, which implies full
insurance.

BAKER AND SIEGELMAN - FINAL

2010:79

7/9/2010 2:38 PM

Tontines for the Invincibles

99

In addition, though, the individual can also choose to receive an amount
T if the loss does not occur (which happens with probability (1-p )).75
The fair premium for this payment is (1-p )T, and just as with
insurance, the tontine premium must be paid whether or not the loss
occurs or the prize is awarded.
As before, the individual still prefers full insurance. But what
about the optimal size of T ? It should be clear that a risk-averse
individual will not find paying a fair rate for a tontine prize (paid if the
loss does not occur) to be in his interest. Doing so requires the insured
to move dollars from the loss state, where he pays the tontine premium
with dollars that are scarce (and thus worth more, in utility terms) to
the no-loss state, where he receives the tontine prize in dollars that are
plentiful (and thus worth less, in utility terms). Put another way, the
prize adds financial risk, and should thus be abhorrent to a rational,
risk-averse utility maximizer.

C. Why Tontines Should Be Attractive to the Invincibles
1. OPTIMISM BIAS LEADS TO UNDER-INSURANCE (OR NONE AT ALL)
Instead of assuming that individuals have accurate perceptions of
all relevant risks, consider an Invincible—someone who suffers from
optimism bias. We can characterize this bias in many ways, but the
simplest version is that for a loss that occurs with objective probability
p, an Invincible assigns it a subjective probability of q, which is smaller
than p. In making his insurance purchase decision, the optimistic
individual will choose the amount of coverage to maximize expected
utility given his subjective probability of loss, not the objective one.
The objective probability, however, will still be used by the insurer to
set the premium.

75.
Of course, this amount T does not fall out of the sky. It must be paid for
somehow. One possibility is that T is paid for out of additional premiums. That is, the
insured might be charged an actuarially fair premium, p, to cover expected losses, and
an additional amount to cover payouts in the event that there is no loss. So, for
example, if p is 0.1, then the probability of no-loss is (1-p) = 0.9. Suppose the loss, L,
is equal to 1,000 and the tontine “prize” T is equal to 10. Then the premium required
to support the prize is (1-p)T = 0.9×10 = 9. Thus someone who bought the combined
tontine policy would have to pay 0.05×1,000 = 50 for the insurance coverage and 9
for the “prize,” for a total of 59. T might alternatively (or in addition) be paid for out
of investment income earned by the insurance company on the “float” between the time
when premiums are collected and the time when losses are paid out. But that
complication does not add anything to the simple model we consider because if there
were such a float, it could be used to reduce premiums below the actuarially fair level,
were there no tontine element to support.
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It is easy to show that someone characterized by optimism bias
who faces an actuarially fair premium will choose to buy less than full
insurance and may purchase none at all: this makes sense, since such a
person sees less reason to transfer wealth from the no-accident to the
accident state of the world. Invincibles do not appreciate the need for
insurance, precisely because their subjective assessment of the
probability of loss is too low.
2. A PRIZE MAKES THE POLICY LOOK MORE ATTRACTIVE TO AN
OPTIMIST

Since the insurer is by assumption charging actuarially fair rates, it
is not possible to lower premiums to induce the optimist to buy (more)
insurance—that would mean the insurer could not collect sufficient
premium revenue to cover its payouts and would earn losses (unless it
received a subsidy).76
However, a fairly priced tontine structure would break even for
the insurer and, under some conditions, could induce optimists to buy
insurance who would otherwise not want to do so. The reason is that
the insurer needs to charge (1-p ) per dollar of tontine prize awarded.
The insured, however, expects to receive the prize with probability (1q ), where by definition (1-q > 1-p ). The gamble thus looks like a good
deal for exactly the same reason (optimism bias) the insurance looks
like a bad one.
Although the insurance contract by itself will not be attractive to
some invincibles, the perceived subsidy from bundling a prize should
be enough to induce some of them to sign up for the prize/insurance
combination. The reason is that the optimist’s under-assessment of the
probability of loss is at least partially matched by his over-assessment
of the probability of gain. The availability of the tontine “prize”
balances out the invincibles’ unwarranted undervaluation of the
insurance. In fact, tontine health insurance has a kind of “ju-jitsu”
element to it, because it uses consumers’ very irrationality to induce
them to make welfare-enhancing choices they would otherwise forego.
It is important to be clear that adding the prize only works, in
mathematical terms, if the wrongly perceived “extra” value of the prize
is as large as the wrongly perceived “discounted” value of the
76.
If the insurance is being sold with some load factor that makes premiums
larger than is actuarially fair, it might be possible to lower the load factor, reduce
premiums, and still allow the insurer to cover its costs. But it is difficult to imagine
how society could force insurers to lower their costs. Given that such cost reduction is
difficult to achieve, it is widely understood that the only way to make insurance more
attractive to the uninsured without making it unprofitable to the provider is to subsidize
its purchase. We suggest otherwise.
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insurance. Suppose for example that the true probability of a $20,000
loss is 10 percent, but the optimist mistakenly believes the probability
to be only 1 percent. Even if full insurance against this loss can be
purchased for $2,000, the Invincible will likely reject such insurance,
believing it should cost only $200. Now suppose that the insurer
bundles the fairly priced insurance with a tontine prize of $10,000
(payable if the loss does not occur, which happens with 90 percent
probability). The fair price for the prize alone is $9,000, and the fair
price for the combination of prize and insurance is thus $11,000.
Although the Invincible believes he is getting a good deal on the prize
element (paying $9,000 for a perceived 99 percent chance of winning
$10,000), he also believes he is getting a correspondingly bad deal on
the insurance element; and since the “extra” value attributable to his
optimistic assessment of the likelihood of winning the tontine prize
($999) is smaller than the “discounted” value of the insurance ($1,800),
the prize/insurance bundle is still unattractive.
There are several reasons to think that, in practice, the
prize/insurance bundle might be more attractive than this simple
example suggests, however. The first reason is history. The
prize/insurance bundle was tremendously successful in the lifeinsurance context despite the same mathematical limitation described
above.77 The second reason is that real insurance is not complete (most
significantly because of deductibles), which reduces the wrongly
assessed discounted value of the insurance that the prize needs to offset.
Using the numbers from above, if we assume that the insurance covers
only 80 percent of the loss, then the (wrongly) discounted value of the
insurance will be $1,620 ($1,800-180). That is still more than $999, but
the gap is smaller. Third, it is plausible that optimists may be lossaverse as well as overly optimistic. They misperceive the risk, but they
are still willing to pay some amount above the actuarially fair price of
the risk that they do perceive, further reducing the discount that the
optimist places on the value of the insurance; and they may even be
risk-preferrers for small gambles, which of course makes the prize
more attractive than it would be on purely actuarial grounds. Finally,
the fact that insurance is socially desirable to purchase increases its
perceived value even to an optimist, who presumably is just as
motivated to do socially acceptable things as everyone else.
So, for example, a young man might be willing to pay significantly
more than what he perceives to be the actuarially fair price for health
insurance, not only because he is risk-averse, but also because that will
make his mother happy and make him feel responsible. He is not
willing to buy the insurance as it exists today, because the price is just
77.

See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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too far from what he thinks the insurance is worth, even considering
risk aversion and social expectation, but the gap between the price and
the willingness to pay is smaller than his optimism alone would predict.
These other factors should not substantially impact the prize side
of the equation. The loading charge for adding a prize element to health
insurance should be close to trivial. Risk aversion does not appear to be
symmetric, as the research suggests that humans have a taste for
gambling as long as the stakes are not too large. Finally, his mother is
not likely to care very much that he chose the insurance policy with a
prize, especially if it is called something more socially acceptable. We
will call the prize a deferred dividend, and market tontine health
insurance as a tool that helps young people save for the future. His
mother will like that and, we predict, so will he.

D. Targeting, Efficacy, and “Bang for the Buck” Issues
Given the political economy of health care and the widespread
belief that we will need to publicly subsidize insurance for the currently
uninsured, one legitimate concern for public policy is the size of such
subsidies, and the extent to which they are directed towards those who
currently lack insurance, rather than just making health insurance
cheaper for those who already have it. Finding a way to make insurance
more attractive to the uninsured, without “wasting” funds by making it
cheaper for those who are already insured, is thus a difficult
institutional design issue, as Gruber stresses. In his helpful analogy,78
we can
think about the uninsured as tuna and those who already have
insurance as dolphins. The goal of environmentally conscious
fishermen is to catch as many tuna as possible in their nets,
while minimizing the number of dolphins who are
caught. . . . If the uninsured tunas were swimming in a
separate ocean than the insured dolphins, the problem would
be minimized. And if the uninsured tunas greatly
outnumbered the insured dolphins, then there would also be a
minimal dolphin catch. But, in reality, the 47 million
uninsured tunas mostly swim in a part of the ocean where
there are 190 million privately insured dolphins, making it

78.
Gruber, supra note 49, at 585–86. To the extent that one uses subsidies to
alter behavior, any money directed towards those already engaged in the desired
behavior is a waste. In tax policy, the problem of subsidizing pre-existing conduct
while trying to create incentives for new behavior is known as “buying the base.” Id. at
585.
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difficult if not impossible for policymakers to design
insurance nets to capture the tuna without pulling in the much
more numerous dolphins.
As Gruber points out, at every income level most people are
insured.79 Thus, basing subsidies for health insurance on income would
thus result in spending considerable sums on those who are already
insured, while netting relatively few uninsured.
Tontine health insurance can help to mitigate this problem for two
reasons. First, allowing private insurers to bundle prizes with health
insurance requires no governmental outlay at all! At least from a
budgetary perspective, this is a zero-cost strategy for reducing
uninsurance.80 Moreover, although tontines would catch some dolphins,
they would be more attractive to the tuna we care about: the invincibles
who have demonstrated that they are not willing to purchase an existing
policy.81 And the dolphins captured by the tontine net would not be
harmed. Indeed, from their perspective, the tontine option would be
utility enhancing.
IV. DESIGN OPTIONS
If we are to be true to the tontine idea, then the payoff in the good
state of the world should be a deferred dividend paid to people who did
not otherwise use their insurance, rather than a monthly prize or other
lottery for which all policyholders are eligible. Even limiting the
product design in that way, there are still a wide variety of options. To
explore those options, we ask a series of questions and offer some
tentative answers. An actual tontine health-insurance product would
obviously require extensive consumer research, for which our
discussion is no substitute. Instead, our goal here is to describe some of
the ways that a tontine health-insurance product could be designed and
to highlight some of the more important choices involved in the design
process.

79.
Id. at 586.
80.
It is important to remember that budgetary outlays are not an end in
themselves, and that a true welfare analysis is substantially more complicated.
81.
In this respect at least, a tontine prize is like other aspects of insurer-side
selection. See, e.g., Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Risk Adjustment in
Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
1055 (2000) (pointing out how HMO coverage can be designed to select for certain
groups). For example, bundling a health club membership with premiums is likely to be
especially attractive to young, healthy, low-risk insureds; offering excellent oncology
care has the reverse selective effect.
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Analytically, the components of a tontine policy are the eligibility
threshold (what it takes to qualify for the prize), the size of the prize
itself, the duration of the eligibility period, and the size of the
premium. Of course, these are not completely independent parameters:
for example, the choice of a threshold and a prize amount will
determine the premium the insurer must charge to break even.

A. Eligibility
1. THE EXPENSE THRESHOLD
How should we think about the health-care expense threshold that
will be used to condition eligibility for the dividend? Setting a precise
number will require technical assistance from a health-insurance
actuary, but there are judgments involved that have marketing and, in
some cases, even public-policy consequences. For example, should the
threshold be set relatively low so that fewer people can get larger
dividends, or should it be set higher so that more people get relatively
smaller dividends? In general we are agnostic with regard to this and
subsequent questions. We prefer whatever product design works, in the
sense of being most appealing to people who do not buy traditional
health insurance. But it is possible that setting the threshold too low
might in some cases discourage participants from getting care that they
need. We address this concern shortly.
2. DURATION OF ELIGIBILITY PERIOD
How long should the deferred dividend period be? Answering this
question requires more granular information than we have about healthinsurance purchasing patterns. If the period is too short, the dividend
will not appear enticing enough. If it is too long, the hyperbolic
discounting that is likely to be another characteristic of the young
invincibles will make the dividend appear too small. Moreover, people
may think that they will never be able to collect, perhaps because they
will assume that they will eventually get a good job that includes good
health-care benefits. This last issue brings us directly to our next
question.
3. ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Should eligibility for the dividend be conditioned on something
other than the health-care expense threshold? For example, should
eligibility for the dividend depend on the policyholder having received
designated preventive care? For us, once again, the best answer is

BAKER AND SIEGELMAN - FINAL

2010:79

7/9/2010 2:38 PM

Tontines for the Invincibles

105

whatever the marketing research reveals to be most popular. We predict
that simpler plans will work better, and that conditioning eligibility on
preventive care smacks of the paternalism that the young invincibles
reject. Many of the same public-health benefits sought by mandating
preventive care may be gained by exempting preventive care expenses
from counting against the threshold, and by marketing preventive care
as the smart thing to do to stay healthy enough to get the dividend.
(Indeed, as we plan to explore in subsequent work, the deferreddividend concept could well allow a more socially acceptable form of
managed care.)

B. Payout Size
Should the deferred dividend be fixed in advance? Or should it
depend on variables such as the percentage of policyholders who are
eligible for the dividend at the time of distribution? If it is not fixed,
what are potential variables, and what is at stake with regard to each?
Here we predict that a variable dividend would out-perform a fixed
dividend, by recruiting the optimism bias to magnify the predicted size
of the dividend that the invincible participant believes he will receive.
A variable dividend also works better from an actuarial perspective by
reducing the risk to the insurance company. The tontine idea suggests
simply dividing the dividend pie by the number of the people eligible
for the dividend. It would be interesting to take that idea a step further
and make the size of the pie depend on the profitability of the pool. We
predict that young adults would not like this last variation because they
would not trust health-insurance companies’ computation of profits,
but, once again, market research should produce a more reliable answer
than our intuitions.

C. Other Considerations
1. INTERACTION WITH EMPLOYEE-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE
How should tontine health insurance interact with employmentbased health benefits? We conceived of tontine health insurance as an
individual market product, not something that would be offered as an
employment benefit (but we could imagine that deferred dividends
could play an important role in managing moral hazard in the
employment context, as we plan to explore in subsequent work). Our
current focus in the relationship between tontine health insurance and
employment-based benefits lies in alleviating the young invincibles’
legitimate concern that they might not qualify for the dividend because
they will find a good job, with good benefits, before the deferred-
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dividend period is up. To address that concern, we suggest the tontine
policies offer participants the ability to cash out their dividend rights if
they exit the plan to purchase an employment-based policy for which
they recently became eligible. In addition, we are intrigued by the
possibility of offering the option of retaining the deferred-dividend
participation rights if the participant enrolls in an employment-based
program run by the same company as the company running the health
insurance tontine.82
2. INVERSE MORAL HAZARD?
Under what plausible circumstances might a participant’s concern
about exceeding the health-care expense threshold lead him or her to
forgo incurring a health-care expense and suffer adverse health
consequences as a result? 83 What could be done to address that
problem? Again, we take no firm position on this important issue,
preferring to leave the question to future experimentation. We do note
that economists almost universally believe that the low deductible
coverage provided by virtually all health-insurance plans is overly
generous because it encourages (ex post) moral hazard and over-use of
insurance, but provides relatively little of the consumption-spreading
benefits that (allegedly) motivate insurance purchases in the first place.
Martin Feldstein’s design for optimal insurance, for example, would
involve a 50 percent co-payment for expenses up to 10 percent of the
insured’s income, with full coverage thereafter.84 In short, there may be
good reasons to discourage “over-use” of health insurance (while, of
course, lowering premiums). If so, the tontine element could be
designed to serve this function by appropriately calibrating eligibility
for the “prize” to the amount of use. More complicated prize functions
could exempt certain kinds of health-care expenditures (e.g., preventive
medicine such as routine checkups, flu shots). Usage-based restrictions
82.
This possibility offers one way to forge the kind of long term relationships
between consumers and health insurance companies that make investments in preventive
care valuable to insurance companies. At present, people are free to switch insurance
plans each year, and enough do that insurance companies cannot be sure that they will
realize the benefit of investing in preventive care.
83.
Richard Derrig pointed out to us that there is good evidence of inverse
moral hazard in the Massachusetts safe-driver plan. For accidents that are only slightly
higher than the insured’s deductible, people engage in “roadside settlement” so as to
avoid having a claim show up on their records and raising their future premiums.
Personal Communication with Richard Derrig, NBER Insurance Conference,
Cambridge, Mass. (May 2009).
84.
See Martin S. Feldstein, A New Approach to National Health Insurance,
23 PUB. INT. 93, 103 (1971). Feldstein’s plan also featured a basic deductible of 5
percent of income. See also Gruber, supra note 49, at 578–79.
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on prize eligibility might be accompanied by lower co-pays if it were
unnecessary to use both of these methods to discourage overuse.
Shorter eligibility periods with vested dividend rights could be another
answer to the concern about inverse moral hazard. With shorter
periods, going to the doctor only risks the dividend rights from the
current period, not the rights to the entire three-year deferred dividend.
On the other hand, the easier the dividend is to get, the more people
will get it, and the smaller and therefore less enticing it will have to be.
V. IMPLEMENTATION: A CALIBRATED EXAMPLE
In this Part, we consider a back-of-the-envelope empirical
implementation of a tontine health-insurance policy. We envision the
tontine element bundled with an ordinary health-insurance policy (as
sold on the individual market), rather than being priced separately. Our
calculations are meant to give a rough sense of how much the tontine
add-on might be expected to raise premiums and what kind of “prizes”
could be offered.
We rely on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data
for 2006 to calibrate the relevant parameters.85 We divide the
population of uninsured eighteen to twenty-nine year olds by gender,
but do not attempt to differentiate them any further. We assume a
tontine period of three years, and further assume that the rate of return
on invested premiums is just equal to the load factor, allowing us to
ignore these issues.86
Our tontine policy consists of four parameters, of which any three
can be chosen by the insurer. We define:

T = size of tontine prize at the end of three years.
τ = monthly premium collected to support the prize
Θ = threshold for spending over the previous three years that
defines eligibility for the tontine prize.87

85.
For MEPS data, see Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Summary Data
Tables, http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables.jsp.
86.
The administrative expenses associated with running the tontine should be
very low, since the policy would be piggy-backing on—and indeed, would be bundled
with and indistinguishable from—ordinary individual health insurance. There might be
some fixed costs associated with setting up the software to keep track of eligibility, but
marginal costs should be quite low. On the other hand, because the product is new and
rather unusual, it might require more involvement by sales agents, at least in early
years.
87.
For instance, if Θ = $2,000, those individuals who spend less than $2,000
over three years are eligible for a rebate at the end of that period.
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p = F(Θ) = probability that an insured is eligible for the
prize (i.e., spends less than the threshold amount), where F is
the empirical cumulative distribution function for health care
expenditures by individually insured policyholders of a given
gender, ages eighteen to twenty-nine, as calculated from the
MEPS data.

To close the model, we simply assume that competition among
insurers drives the expected payout to equal the total monthly premium
collected, or

p (Θ)T = 36τ.
Selection issues are, of course, of paramount importance in the
provision of insurance. An important feature of the tontine policy,
however, is that it has precisely the reverse selection effect from
ordinary insurance—the tontine is most attractive to the individuals who
think they are the healthiest (since they are most likely to expect to
receive the end-of-period rebate). To account for moral hazard, we
calibrate health-care usage, and hence the threshold and prize amounts,
based on the insured population of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds.
That is, we assume that the uninsured will have the same utilization as
the currently insured. (To the extent that the uninsured who would be
motivated to buy a tontine health-insurance policy are healthier than the
currently insured because of adverse selection, this imparts a
conservative bias to our utilization estimates.88)
We do not account, however, for “inverse moral hazard,” created
by the incentive that the tontine provides to under-utilize insurance. Of
course, the advantage of bundling a tontine with an ordinary healthinsurance policy is that deliberate underutilization of the insurance to
secure eligibility for the prize creates a benefit to the insurer. But
consider someone facing a $500 expenditure threshold and a prize of
$1,000. At the margin, a reduction in spending of $1 earns $1,000 by
putting the person below the threshold, while the insurer saves $1 and
pays out $1,000. In other words, if there is “bunching” at the
threshold, the insurer’s savings in covered expenses may be outweighed
by the additional payouts for prizes to those falling below the threshold.
88.
A more problematic assumption relates to the correlation of health care
expenditures across years. Since the MEPS data do not permit one to track individuals
for three years, we assume in constructing our estimates that health care usage is
independent across years. To the extent that this is not true, the threshold may need to
be lower to achieve the same T. This uncertainty is yet another reason to promise a
deferred dividend that is based on a share of the dividend pool, rather than a specific
amount.
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One solution, in keeping with the design of the original tontines and
with modern variable annuities, might be to make the prize a share of
the total deferred dividend: the more shares, the smaller the dollar
value of each individual’s share of the dividend, and vice versa.
Alternatively, we could use percentile rather than dollar thresholds to
qualify for the prize. That is, instead of specifying that those spending
below, say, $500, are eligible, one could instead limit eligibility to the
lowest-spending 10 percent of all insureds.89 Both solutions transfer the
risk of inverse moral hazard to the insureds themselves. For ease of
exposition, our numerical examples here use fixed prizes. The decision
between fixed and variable prizes for an operating tontine healthinsurance plan should be based on market research. We favor whatever
works.
According to a report by AHIP, the average monthly premium of
eighteen to twenty-nine year olds in the individually insured market was
about $120 in 2006–07.90 We consider monthly premiums τ, of $10,
$25, and $50, and eligibility thresholds (Θ) of $250, $500, $750, and
$2,000. This yields a 3×4 matrix of possible prizes that could be
offered, consistent with the insurer’s breakeven constraint, which we
display in Table 1.
Table 1: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for various Monthly Premiums
and Spending Thresholds91 (insured eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old
men only)
Monthly Tontine Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ
Premium, τ
$250
$500
$750
$2,000
$10

$878

$720

$643

$493

$25

$2,195

$1,800

$1,607

$1,223

$50

$4,390

$3,600

$3,214

$2,466

89.
If, for example, 20 percent of insureds spent nothing, then the prize could
be given randomly to only half of those 20 percent, or the prize amount could be cut in
half.
90.
AHIP CENTER FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 7 tbl.2. The
survey covered almost 2.3 million individual market policies, of which over 555,000
were issued to policyholders between eighteen and twenty-nine years of age. Id. The
$120 figure represents the weighted average premium for the eighteen- to twenty-fourand twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-old groups. Id. These premiums are in the same
range as the Tonik premiums. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
91.
The authors’ calculations in Table 1 are based on MEPS data for N=1376
men ages eighteen to twenty-nine, for 2006. “Premium” is for the tontine element only
and excludes the premium for insurance itself. See supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
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The key fact that underlies Table 1 is the relatively low utilization
rate of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men. For example, 41 percent
of insured eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men reported spending less
than $83 on medical care in 2006 (less than $250 over three years, on
our assumptions). This means that the prize that can be awarded for
spending less than $250 over three years is only (1/0.41) 2.4 times the
total premium collected. As the threshold gets larger, the percentage of
participants qualifying for the prize necessarily gets larger, so a $10 per
month premium can only support a $493 prize if the threshold for
eligibility is spending less than $2,000 over three years. Since women
in the MEPS data set are more likely to use care than men, the
corresponding prizes for women are larger by a substantial degree: at
the $250 threshold, the prize for women is 100 percent greater than for
men, falling to about 55 percent greater at the $2,000 threshold.
Table 2 takes the tontine prize amount as given at $5,000, and asks
what combinations of monthly premia and eligibility thresholds would
finance this payout.
Table 2: Eligibility Threshold for a $5,000 Tontine Prize (T), for
various Monthly Premia92 (eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men
only)
Three-Year Threshold Amount for
Monthly Tontine Premium, τ
Eligibility, Θ
$10

$093

$25

$094

$50

$96

A premium of $10 per month represents $360 in total premiums
over three years. Since we know we will pay out $5,000 to those who
qualify, it follows that we are looking for a threshold (Θ) at roughly the
(360/5000) seventh percentile of the health-care utilization distribution.
In fact, roughly 20 percent of insured men ages nineteen to twenty-nine
had no health-care expenses at all in 2006, so the threshold is $0 for
both $10 and $25 premia. To award a $5,000 prize therefore requires
92.
See supra Table 1.
93.
Since about 20 percent of those surveyed reported $0 expenditures, the
$10 premium permits only about one-third of eligibles to collect the $5,000 prize; the
$25 premium permits about 90 percent of eligibles to collect. A randomization
procedure would be required to determine which of the eligibles would collect.
94.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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some sort of randomization for any premium below about $28/month.
For example, at a $10/month premium, only about one-third of those
with no spending could actually receive a $5,000 prize. The similar
figures for women place the seventh percentile at $0, the eighteenth
percentile (corresponding to $25/month premium) at $165, and the
thirty-sixth percentile at $1,077.
Table 3 examines the possibility of exempting “preventive care”
from counting against an insured’s expenditures for purposes of tontine
eligibility. As we discussed earlier, it would make sense from a policy
perspective to encourage insureds to undertake preventive care such as
vaccinations, routine checkups, and so on. An obvious way to do this
would be to exempt such expenditures from counting towards the
tontine threshold. MEPS does not classify expenditures by “preventive”
versus “other,” so we adopt an extremely crude definition of what
constitutes preventive care: for these purposes, “preventive”
expenditures are everything except emergency room and in-patient
hospital expenses.
Table 3: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for Various Monthly Premiums and
Spending Thresholds95 (eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old men only)
Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ´ (Excluding
Monthly
“Preventive Care”)96
Tontine
Premium, τ
$250
$500
$750
$2,000
$10

$409

$406

$400

$384

$25

$1023

$1015

$1001

$959

$50

$2043

$2029

$2002

$1919

Men use less “non-preventive” care than total care, of course, so
the prize that can be offered for a given premium and threshold is
smaller when “preventive” care does not count towards eligibility.
Comparing Table 3 and Table 1, the prizes that can be offered to men
for a given premium are about 50 percent to 75 percent as large if we
exclude everything but emergency room and in-patient expenses. The
male-female gap in “non-preventive” care is smaller than for total care
expenses, with the result that eliminating “preventive” care from
counting towards the eligibility threshold substantially lowers the size
of the prize available to women, cutting the amount by more than two
thirds for the lowest threshold.
95.
See supra Table 1.
96.
“Preventative” care assumed to include everything but expenditures on
emergency room and in-patient hospital care.
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Finally, we consider a scenario that attempts to account for
selection. The tontine will be least attractive to those uninsured with the
highest expected health-care utilization, since they are least likely to
qualify for the prize. (Of course, these are precisely the people who
would have been most likely to sign up for insurance already, but
suppose for some reason they failed to do so.) Table 4 shows what
happens if the tontine policy were not attractive to this group. As
compared with Table 1, feasible prizes are about two thirds to three
quarters as large, because instead of, for example, 41 percent of all
insureds spending less than $250 over three years, 63 percent do (once
we have eliminated the top 10 percent of all spenders).
Table 4: Size of Tontine Prize (T ), for Various Monthly Premium
Amounts and Spending Thresholds97 (eighteen- to twenty-nine-yearold men only, excluding the highest-using 10 percent)
Monthly
Three-Year Spending Threshold, Θ98
Tontine
$250
$500
$750
$2,000
Premium, τ
$10

$574

$479

$433

$367

$25

$1,435

$1,198

$1,803

$917

$50

$2,871

$2,397

$2,166

$1,835

VI. IF HEALTH TONTINES WOULD BE SO EFFECTIVE, WHERE ARE
THEY?
One short answer is that something like a health tontine is already
being marketed in China, where the Ping An Life Insurance Company
recently began selling “policies that combine life, accident,
hospitalization, critical disease, endowment, and dividend
components.”99 Like insurance companies in other developing
countries—including the U.S. in the nineteenth century, and Japan in
the mid-twentieth century—Chinese insurers have found that deferred
dividends appeal to the insurance-resistant.100 Private, supplemental
97.
See supra Table 1.
98.
Assumes that the highest-utilizing 10 percent of uninsured do not sign up
for coverage, and that their spending would be equivalent to that of the 10 percent
highest-using insureds.
99.
See Cheris Shun-ching Chan, Creating a Market in the Presence of
Cultural Resistance: The Case of Life Insurance in China, 38 THEORY & SOC’Y 271,
294 (2009).
100. See Chan, supra note 41, at epilogue (detailing the history of life
insurance in Japan).
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health insurers in Europe have also offered deferred dividend health
insurance plans, suggesting that health tontines can appeal to consumers
in developed countries as well.101
A longer and admittedly more speculative answer to this question
revolves around the longstanding effort to separate insurance from
gambling, a related commitment among insurance practitioners to an
understanding of insurance that leaves little room for “spicy” insurance
products, the self-conscious transformation of health-insurance
companies into health-care companies, and lingering (but misplaced)
concerns about the legality of tontines.

A. Separating Insurance from Gambling
Until Parliament passed the Gambling Act in 1774, it was possible
and indeed common to purchase insurance on a stranger’s life in Great
Britain.102 Such insurance came to be condemned as gambling, and the
Gambling Act was part of an effort to separate insurance from other
sorts of speculation that continue today, as represented by the current
controversies over credit default swaps and stranger-owned life
insurance.103
Many states in the U.S. adopted the Gambling Act’s insurable
interest requirement, which prohibited the purchase of insurance on a
life or property in which the purchaser did not have an interest.104 Even
with this legal fence between insurance and gambling in place,
nineteenth-century bankers still derided insurance as gambling, on the
grounds that the insurance payoff depended on a random event—death,
in the case of life insurance—rather than the slow and steady

101. See Zweifel, supra note 47; Peter Zweifel, Bonus Options in Health
Insurance, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992. (Thank you to H.E. Frech for bringing the

European experience to our attention.)
102. See GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695–1775, at 49, 62–63, 89–90 (1999) (concluding that the
prudential aspect of life insurance did not succeed the speculative aspect until at least
1850).
103. See Derivative Markets Transparency & Accountability Act, H.R. 977,
110th Cong. § 16 (1st Sess. 2009) (proposing insurable interest requirement for credit
default swaps); Sarah Quinn, The Transformation of Morals in Markets: Death,
Benefits, and the Exchange of Life Insurance Policies, 114 AM. J. SOC. 738, 740
(2008) (investigating “questions of wagering, speculation, and trust” in the secondary
market for life insurance). Cf. Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce
Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843, 844 (1931) (exploring the difficulty of distinguishing
between hedging and speculation).
104. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 274 (4th ed. 2007) (providing a non-exhaustive list of states).
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accumulation of savings.105 Insurance entrepreneurs responded to this
charge in a variety of ways: drawing analytical distinctions (gamblers
seek gains while insurers seek protection against loss),106 pointing to the
good reputation and high standards of people in the insurance
industry,107 and publicizing their efforts to exclude the immoral from
the insurance pool.108
Nevertheless, the gambling charge clearly struck home. Indeed,
some prominent insurance industry leaders mounted that same charge
against tontine life insurance.109 While these insurance men surely
would not accept the “gambling” label for a lump-sum payment made
upon the fortuity of the death of a particular insured (i.e., the death
benefit), they were willing to apply that label to a lump-sum payment
that depended on the fortuity of the number of people who died before
the deferred dividend was paid. As inconsistent as that position may
have been in theory, this internal critique from within the insurance
industry played an important part in the early twentieth-century reform
of the mutual life insurance business. 110
When reformers sought to pacify the powerful mutual life
insurance companies that profited from tontine life insurance, they used
all the rhetorical tools at their disposal—including the conceptual link
between tontines and gambling. When the reformers succeeded in 1906,
they outlawed tontine life insurance, and their victory story recounted
105. See, e.g., A.B. Johnson, The Relative Merits of Life Insurance and
Savings Banks, 25 HUNT’S MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COM. REV. 670, 671 (1851) (arguing
that “life insurance assimilates with gambling” and that “we should provide for these
purposes by self-denying accumulations”—in banks such as those he operated, of
course).
106. See, e.g., George W. Savage, Origin and Nature of Fire Insurance, 4
HUNT’S MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COM. REV. 159, 160 (1841) (“Insurance is, in reality,
nothing more than a wager . . . but in a moral point of view, it should be considered
entirely different.”).
107. See, e.g., H.S. TIFFANY, TIFFANY’S INSTRUCTION BOOK FOR FIRE
INSURANCE AGENTS 20 (1883) (“This business is not a mere lottery or game of chance,
but an honorable one in which some of the most experienced men of the age are
engaged, and in which millions of dollars are invested.”).
108. See VIVIAN A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 72, 96–97, 110–11, 117
(1979); cf. Quinn, supra note 93, at 741 (“[T]he spirit of insurable interest . . .
established the decency of life insurance . . . because it kept the insurance from being a
gamble . . . .”).
109. See KELLER, supra note 34, at 57 (“Deferred dividends became a special
target of insurance men opposed to the corporate values of the great companies.”).
110. See, e.g., Jacob L. Greene, Letter to Editor, Facts About Tontine: The
Alleged Enormity of the Wickedness, N.Y. TRIB., May 9, 1885 (“[T]he Tontine
principle in life insurance is absolute, unqualified gambling . . .”); Manly, supra note
7, at 183–87. See generally CONN. MUT. LIFE INS. CO., PAPERS RELATING TO TONTINE
INSURANCE (1885–86).
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the earlier debased nature of the insurance industry and the morally
superior forms of life insurance that remained after the Armstrong
investigation’s “ordeal of corporate sackcloth and ashes.”111 To this
day, the fact that some life insurance companies did not participate in
the “tontine affair” of late-nineteenth-century life-insurance industry
remains a point of pride among their employees.112

B. A Cultural Commitment to Insurance as a Risk-Management
Technology
When the sociologist Cheris Shun-ching Chan investigated the
Chinese life-insurance market in the early 2000s, she was initially
surprised at the success of inexperienced, undercapitalized local
insurers in their competition with well-capitalized, experienced Western
insurers in the Chinese market. She concluded that the local insurers’
inexperience actually gave them an advantage, because they were more
willing to provide what their customers wanted: life insurance that paid
deferred dividends.113 The foreign insurers’ experience had taught them
that life insurance was “really” about managing the risk of premature
death, and that life insurance was not a good savings or investment
product.114 Yet their Chinese customers did not want to talk or even
think about premature death.115 Instead they wanted to accumulate
money to live the comfortable old age that precedes a good death. So
they preferred to buy the financially insecure, but more culturally
resonant products offered by the upstart local companies. Eventually,
the foreign insurers caught on, and began offering similar products.116
111. KELLER, supra note 34, at 275. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE
UNDERWRITERS 58, 61, 65 (1906) (address of Young E. Allison) (describing the poison
of tontine life insurance and explaining that the results of the Armstrong investigation
will be to “take [the] element of gambling out” of life insurance and restore it to “the
highest gospel of co-operative organization that ever was preached”); see generally
BURTON J. HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1907) (recounting the events
leading up to the Armstrong investigation as a “thirty years’ war” between “the good
and the bad in life insurance” concluding with the triumph of Jacob Greene—the
“good” anti-tontine leader who lost in market share but won in principle—over Henry
Hyde—the “bad” purveyor of tontines who won in market share but lost his reputation).
112. Personal Communication with Robert Googins, former General Counsel
of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company.
113. See Chan, supra note 99. See also Cheris Shun-ching Chan, Honing the
Desired Attitude: Ideological Work on Insurance Sales Agents, in WORKING IN CHINA:
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF LABOR AND WORKPLACE TRANSFORMATION 229, 229–46 (2007);
Chan, supra note 41.
114. See Chan, supra note 99.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Although this is a difficult claim to document, we think that U.S.
health insurers are even more committed to insurance as risk
management than U.S. life insurers.117 The Blue Cross and Blue Shield
plans grew out of efforts by doctors to provide financing for hospital
care, and their leadership always resisted being considered part of the
insurance industry.118 Although the big commercial U.S. health insurers
like Aetna and CIGNA mostly grew out of the life-insurance business,
the primary connection between the life and health businesses in those
companies was a shared commitment to selling group policies to large
corporate customers. Group life insurance, like group health insurance,
is marketed in the U.S. exclusively as a risk-management product, not
as a way to accumulate savings. Aside from this shared marketing, the
life and health divisions in a commercial insurance company have little
to do with each other, and the designers of the health-insurance
products do not think of themselves as being in the same business as
more “spicy” asset-accumulation life-insurance products. Accordingly,
both the Blues and the commercial insurers share an understanding of
health insurance as a health risk-management and risk-spreading
product, not an instrument of accumulation.

C. The Transformation of the Health-Insurance Industry into a HealthCare Administration Industry
The transformation of the traditional indemnity health-insurance
product into the plethora of managed care products that dominate the
health insurance market today has made a health insurance tontine even
less thinkable for an executive at an Aetna, CIGNA, United Health, or
a Blue. Today, health insurance is about the administration of health
care, and many people in the industry would deny that they are in the
insurance business at all.119 The more health insurance becomes a
business of delivering and managing health care, the less plausible the
tontine feature will seem to a health-insurance company executive.
Indeed, the tontine feature highlights the messy, morally ambiguous
history of the insurance business, just the kind of thing that the healthcare financing industry MBAs and MDs are running away from as
quickly as they can.
117. Cf. Quinn, supra note 103, at 742 (“Just as a geological formation bears
the traces of the environment that sculpted it, so too does a market bear the imprint of
the social currents that shaped its development.”).
118. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1984).
119. See Email from John Day, former Chief Health Counsel, CIGNA, to Tom
Baker (Feb. 18, 2009, 05:44 PM EST) (on file with author) (further explaining that the
vast majority of the health-insurance business today is administrative, with other parties
bearing much of the risk).
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The recent efforts that some health-insurance companies have
made to develop new products that would be more appealing to the
young invincibles provides a useful illustration of the disconnect
between the young invincibles’ preferences and the health-insurance
industry’s assessments.120 The marketing materials for the new policies
reflect the need for some spice. There are snappy graphics, fast cuts on
Web pages, and slang drawn from extreme sports.121 But the products
are just stripped-down managed-care policies that offer less coverage
for a lower price.122 These bland products may appeal to people who
are not buying insurance because they need the money to pay the rent,
but they are not going to appeal to people who do not think that they
need health insurance. The invincibles will reason—correctly—that they
are even less likely to “collect” under the stripped down policies.

D. Lingering Concerns about the Legality of Tontine Insurance
We have identified three potential legal concerns about insurance
tontines, none of which would apply to a properly designed health
tontine. First, state insurance codes commonly prohibit insurance
rebating, which is the practice of refunding to customers some or all of
their premiums or providing some other benefit to them (other than
insurance) in return for their premiums.123 This might seem to present a
serious legal objection to a tontine. On close analysis, however, the
objection melts away, because the statutes explicitly permit rebating
that is “plainly expressed in the insurance contract.”124 Moreover,
tontines are not the kind of agreement that the anti-rebating statutes
were designed to discourage, since they do not threaten the solvency of
the company or agents’ commission rates, and there is no covert
discrimination between similarly situated policyholders. 125
Fuhrmans, supra note 66.
Id.
Id.
See Spencer L. Kimball & Bartlett A. Jackson, The Regulation of
Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 141, 146–47 (1961).
124. Robert H. Jerry II & Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the
Negotiation of Insurance Agent Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under
State Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775, 783 (1990) (discussing a greatly
120.
121.
122.
123.

influential Model Act promulgated by The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) in 1947). As of 1990, forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia had an anti-rebating statute (California passed but later repealed a statute),
and forty-seven of those states have modeled their statute directly on the Model Act, so
there is general uniformity in anti-rebating laws among the states. Id. at 775.
125. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, “it is obvious that the
object of [the anti-rebating statute] is to outlaw ‘unfair treatment of prospective
insurants of the same class by offering inducements to one person that are not available
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Second, New York and many other states passed legislation
immediately after the Armstrong investigation that prohibited lifeinsurance tontines.126 Significantly, this legislation applies only to “life
insurance companies,”127 and not to health-insurance companies (which
did not exist at the time of the 1907 legislation). Moreover, the primary
objective of this anti-life-tontine statute was to prevent life-insurance
companies from using the deferred dividends to accumulate large
surpluses over long periods, tempting insurers to engage in financial
manipulation, a concern that would not apply to a health-insurance
tontine.128
Third, states closely regulate games of chance and gambling, and
there might be some concern in light of insurance history that tontine
health insurance could be characterized as being in part a game of
chance or a lottery.129 In our judgment these laws would not apply to
health tontines any more than similar laws would have applied to lifeinsurance tontines. A health tontine is not a true lottery or game of
chance. The participants’ right to the dividend would depend on their
own health experience: precisely the sort of legally permissible
to all persons of the same class.’” McDowell v. Good Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 154
A.2d 497, 500 (1959) (quoting In re Insurance Rebate, 19 Pa. D. 567, 569 (Pa. Atty.
Gen. 1909)).
126. See Ransom & Sutch, supra note 25, at 381.
127. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4231 (McKinney 2007). Policyholder’s participation
in surplus of life insurance companies:
(a)(1) Except as herein otherwise provided, every domestic life insurance
company shall ascertain and distribute annually, and not otherwise, the
proportion of any surplus accruing upon every participating insurance
policy and annuity or pure endowment contract entitled as hereinafter
provided to share therein, issued on or after the first day of January,
nineteen hundred seven.
128. See id. § 4231(a)(3) (McKinney 2007). See also id. § 4231 note 2.
129. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 7 (LexisNexis 1992) (Lotteries:
Disposal of Property by Chance):
Whoever sets up or promotes a lottery for money or other property of
value, or by way of lottery disposes of any property of value, or under the
pretext of a sale, gift or delivery of other property or of any right, privilege
or thing whatever disposes of or offers or attempts to dispose of any
property, with intent to make the disposal thereof dependent upon or
connected with chance by lot, dice, numbers, game, hazard or other
gambling device, whereby such chance or device is made an additional
inducement to the disposal or sale of said property, and whoever aids either
by printing or writing, or is in any way concerned, in the setting up,
managing or drawing of such lottery, or in such disposal or offer or attempt
to dispose of property by such chance or device, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than three thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than three years, or in jail or the house of correction for
not more than two and one half years.
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contingency that lies behind traditional health and life insurance, albeit
in an opposite direction. And the amount of individuals’ dividends
would depend on the health experience of the group as a whole:
precisely the sort of legally permissible contingency that lies behind
traditional mutual insurance dividends.
CONCLUSION
Our positive thesis is that there is a significant and identifiable
group of individuals—the invincibles—who do not buy health insurance
they can afford and “should” want. They wrongly believe that the
insurance is not worthwhile, since nothing bad will happen to them, a
form of optimism bias. Our normative recommendation is that health
insurance should be reformulated so as to make it more attractive to
these invincibles by taking advantage of their optimism. By bundling
health insurance with a deferred dividend or “prize,” insurers should be
able to entice this group to buy coverage they would not otherwise
choose to purchase. Prizes have historically been used to sell life
insurance in much this way, with great success.
But is this a good thing? Why should we “trick” people into
buying insurance they would not otherwise want?130 We think that the
case for doing so is actually quite strong, although we recognize not
everyone will be convinced. First, there are possible externalities at
play when the uninsured fail to secure care for communicable diseases,
although efforts to quantify them suggest that the magnitude of these
externalities is small. The uninsured also rely heavily on the public fisc
to pay for the care that they do receive, but the amount of
uncompensated care is quite small compared to total health-care
expenditures, so the fiscal externality is not large. The strongest
argument comes from the evidence that a significant number of young
adults who lack insurance are hampered in their ability to seek medical
care, relative to those who are insured. So there is a plausible
paternalistic rationale for getting the invincibles enrolled in health care
for their own good.131 As noted earlier, moreover, our proposal only
works because it appeals to the invincibles’ optimism bias. Anyone who
is rational and immune to the bias should not find tontine health
insurance attractive. Thus, we can be fairly confident that whoever is
“tricked” into buying under our proposal suffers from a cognitive
130. As Jonathan Gruber perceptively notes, “the simple fact that so many are
without insurance is not necessarily a cause for public-policy intervention; many more
individuals do not own their own homes or are obese.” Gruber, supra note 49, at 581.
131. Gruber concurs, suggesting that “the major motive for caring about the
uninsured is paternalism.” Id. at 582.
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illusion that impairs their potential claims to be the best judge of their
own interests.
Tontine health insurance has an additional advantage over other
plans to cover the invincibles: it would be much less coercive than
insurance mandates, and much less costly than subsidizing insurance to
make it cheap enough to be attractive.132 Even those who disagree with
the idea of extending coverage to the invincibles would presumably
agree that whatever coverage we do provide should be done as cheaply
and as light-handedly as possible. Tontine health insurance meets those
objectives.
The time has come, we think, to revive the tontine, a nineteenthcentury insurance innovation that capitalizes on some fundamental
truths about human nature to design better insurance.

132.

One insurance blogger recently wrote that:

[U]nless the gummint [sic] makes it more painful to not buy coverage than
to do so, people are more likely to ignore any such requirement. We saw
this in Massachusetts, where folks who failed to play along lost an
exemption worth about $200. Compared to potentially thousands of dollars
for insurance premiums, who can blame them? Young, healthy people
aren’t stupid : if you don’t hurt them in the wallet, a lot of them are just
going to say “the heck with it.”
Henry Stern, Mandated Missteps, INSUREBLOG.BLOGSPOT.COM, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://insureblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/mandated-missteps.html.

